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The US$1.3 billion Tasi Mane South Coast Petro-
leum Development project is the cornerstone of 
Timor-Leste’s Strategic Development Plan 2011–
2030. The project includes: a supply base, industrial 
estate, airport and new town at Suai; a refinery and 
petrochemical plant at Betano; a liquefied natu-
ral gas plant, airport, and new town at Beacu; and 
a 155-kilometre highway linking all three sites. 
Arguments in favour of the project centre on the 
need for national economic development despite 
evidence that the project may not be economically 
viable (La’o Hamutuk 2013). Aside from crucial 
macroeconomic questions surrounding the viabil-
ity of the project, the land acquisitions needed are 
likely to have significant impacts on local men and 
women who are highly dependent on land, not only 
for food and market production, but also for hous-
ing, firewood, and grazing. Based on field research 
in early 2015, this In Brief provides a preliminary 
overview of the differentiated impacts the project 
is likely to have, and concludes that the land expro-
priation process for the Suai Supply Base runs the 
risk of: severely impoverishing local households, 
increasing inequality between and within house-
holds, and leading to marginalisation and social 
disarticulation1 (Cernea 2000). Issues highlighted 
in this In Brief will be explored in depth in a future 
SSGM Discussion Paper.
The Suai Supply Base
Construction has already begun on the first phase 
of the project in Suai. This phase will occupy over 
1,113 hectares and comprises a supply base for the 
oil industry, a new port, industrial estates, an air-
port, a new city to be called Nova Suai, and two 
crocodile reserves. Conservative estimates suggest 
that the Supply Base will cost the state more than 
US$781 million. 
Pressure to access land for petroleum develop-
ment has led to a fast-paced acquisition process 
characterised by misinformation, a lack of consulta-
tion, and, at times, intimidation. In April 2013, the 
state signed a secret agreement with local tradition-
al leaders who agreed to hand over 1,113 hectares 
of land to the state in return for 10 per cent of the 
supply base profits. Despite government claims that 
the agreement ‘comes after a long process of consul-
tation with the local community’ (RDTL 22/4/2013), 
to date community members remain highly unsure 
of their rights and of the nature of these agreements. 
The Deal: Compensation, Land and Housing
The state originally envisaged acquiring land 
through a 150-year lease promising communities 10 
per cent of the profits. Concerned that the project 
might prove financially unviable, civil society groups 
urged caution. The state eventually laid out a second 
option guaranteeing households US$3 per metre for 
an outright sale of their land. The state has refused 
to compensate communities for losing their homes, 
instead promising to relocate families to state hous-
ing in a suburban-style development, in most cases 
within a few kilometres of their original community.
While the vast majority of the population have 
opted for the US$3 per metre deal, a number of indi-
viduals and households, in particular veterans, have 
opted to stick with the 10 per cent deal, claiming that 
over time it will deliver the best returns. However, 
understanding of this deal appears severely limited, 
highlighting the lack of legal assistance and advice 
provided to communities during the negotiation 
phase. Some individuals believe that they will receive 
10 per cent of the value of their land every month. 
Such confusion has the potential to cause serious con- 
flict between disgruntled communities and the state 
once the reality is more clearly understood. Similar 
cases in Papua New Guinea and Bougainville have 
shown the potential for intergenerational tensions 
when local leaders lease land for long periods, leaving 
future generations to feel the impacts of landlessness.
Differential Impacts of the Project
Land alienation will impact households and their 
individual members in different ways, and may 
increase inequality within local communities. 
Families with access to large tracts of land stand 
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to receive large payments. These people are often 
already part of the local elite and have access to 
land, business opportunities, and political connec-
tions. By contrast, smallholders with one plot of 
land that is affected and a separate house that is not 
affected are essentially losing all of their cultivation 
and agricultural potential. The viability of these 
households depends on being able to use the cash 
payment to either buy new land for cultivation or 
invest in an alternative non-agricultural livelihood.
Families losing their house and only plot of 
land will be relocated to government housing on 
20 x 25 m plots and compensated for the remain-
ing land that they lose (for example (50 x 50 m) + 
house = (20 x 25 m) + house + US$6000). The new 
plots are in cramped housing estates with little free 
land on either side. These families will be left in a 
highly unsustainable and food insecure situation, 
where they will no longer have access to land for 
food production or raising animals. Most families, 
even those who do manage to save the cash com-
pensation, will not have sufficient cash to buy more 
land. This situation will disproportionately affect 
women who are highly dependent on income from 
gardens and small animals kept close to the house. 
Households or individuals who have negotiated 
accommodation and/or access to land through 
family members or other social connections 
are highly vulnerable as the monetisation of the 
housing and land value has thrown their access into 
question. In one case, a woman living in a relative’s 
house with her seven children for 15 years will 
lose her home because the compensation process 
employs a narrow definition of ownership that does 
not reflect local practices of customary access to 
land. She will have to renegotiate access to shelter 
and a basic livelihood, with little or no support or 
protection from the state. Similar stories, as well as 
stories of increasing family disputes over land, were 
heard across affected communities.
Conclusion
If households are unable to either re-establish land-
based livelihoods or create new non-land-based 
livelihoods there is a real risk that the project will 
lead to marginalisation, social disarticulation, 
and impoverishment. The lack of a robust social 
impact assessment, and insufficient monitoring of 
the process and social and economic impacts of 
cash payments at the household level means that 
it will be difficult for the state and other actors to 
develop a deep understanding of how benefits and 
negative impacts are experienced across a range of 
households. There are likely to be many vulnerable 
groups who essentially become invisible to the state 
because they were not consulted or counted in the 
original process, and who will find it difficult to 
access any forms of subsequent support. 
There are no mechanisms in place to ensure that 
the terms of Suai Supply Base agreements are fol-
lowed, and few resources available for local groups 
to monitor and document the complex processes 
that are rolled out as a result of the agreements. 
While arguments of national economic develop-
ment are enticing, a detailed feasibility study should 
be carried out, addressing the potential impacts, 
including how negative impacts might be mitigated 
through consultation, better management, and com-
pensation practices.
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Endnote
1 Social disarticulation is akin to social fragmentation 
and is presented as one of the many causes of 
impoverishment resulting from large scale land 
acquisitions identified by Michael Cernea (2000).
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